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Abstract

In this paper I analyze the conceptions of

internationalism and the international

mind that Mead uses in "The Psychological

Mead and the
International
Mind
Marilyn Fischer

Bases of Internationalism" (1915); in his
1917 Chicago Herald columns defending

U.S. entry into the war; in Mind, Self, and

Society (1934); and in "National-

Mindedness and International Minded-

ness" (1929). I show how the terms

"internationalism" and "the international

mind" arose within conversations among
some Anglo-American thinkers. While

Mead employs these terms in his own

philosophical and sociological theorizing,
he draws their meaning from these conversations and does not generate their meaning
from within his own theorizing. This places
Mead among the "conservative internationalists" of his time. With this analysis, I then
show how Hans Joas's criticisms of Mead's

support for the war are misplaced. I also
show how Meads internationalism, correctly understood, cannot support Mitchell

Aboulafias construction of Mead's cosmo-

politan self. Throughout, I demonstrate

how Mead's discussions of internationalism

need to be read in historical context, and

are more political than scholars such as
Aboulafia and Joas have supposed.
Keywords: Mitchell Aboulafia, Hans Joas,
George Herbert Mead, First World War,

Internationalism, International Mind

March 1919. President Wilson had
returned to the United States from the Paris

Peace Conference with a draft treaty of the
proposed League of Nations.1 Illinois Senator Medill McCormick opposed the Treaty.

Mead responded to McCormick, stating
that America "maintains no rights and seeks
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no ends that are not defensible before the reason and common interests g

of the world." A tidy statement, this is, and compatible with Mitchell 8
Aboulafia's elegant analysis of Mead the internationalist and advocate of p

international mindedness, whom Aboulafia places in companionable odialogue with Kant's sensus communis, with Arendt's community of all tr

humanity, and with Smiths impartial spectator. However, the mood ^

darkens when we realize that Mead made this claim immediately after FJ
asserting that the League of Nations was needed to safeguard the Mon- g

roe Doctrine. Without that backing "we will find ourselves faced by a %

league of Latin nations in America, resentful of our assertion of S^
supremacy in this hemisphere. Over against such a league we would be g
compelled to maintain a vast military establishment and our whole life 5'
would be vitiated by the very system against which we took up arms in

a Prussianized Germany."2 Mead saw the League of Nations as a guar- *
antor of U.S. hegemony over Latin America, thus relieving the United S
States of the burden of maintaining "a vast military establishment" 2
through which to accomplish the same end. Mead s endorsement of ><
U.S. hegemony in Latin America does not sit well with Kant's, Arendt's ^
and Smith's visions of humanity. How are we to understand his advo- 5

cacy of internationalism and international mindedness? x
In this paper I will show how Meads discussions of internationalism *

and the international mind were his contributions to conversations tak-

ing place among some Anglo-American thinkers. The terms' meanings
arose within these conversations. While Mead employs these terms in
his own philosophical and sociological theorizing, he draws their meaning from these conversations and does not generate their meaning from
within his own theorizing. In Part One I describe the conversation
within which the "international mind" played a role, and in Parts Two
through Five I examine how Mead participated in this conversation

between 1915 and 1929. Part Two focuses on his 1915 article, "The

Psychological Basis for Internationalism." Here I show how Mead
places then current conceptions of internationalism within his own

philosophical and sociological theorizing. In Part Three I show how
Meads 1917 Chicago Herald columns defending U.S. entry into the
war and his support for the League to Enforce Peace place him among
"conservative internationalists," and argue that Hans Joas's criticisms of

Mead's support for the war are misplaced.3 In Part Four I examine
Mead's comments about the international mind in Mind, Self, and Society, and show how these passages do not support Aboulafias construction of Mead's cosmopolitanism. Finally, in Part Five I examine Mead's

1929 essay, "National-Mindedness and International Mindedness,"
and show how it reveals gaps in Mead's theorizing. Throughout, I
demonstrate how Mead's discussions of internationalism need to be
read in historical context, and are more political than scholars such as

Aboulafia and Joas have supposed. ^
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co /. The "International Mind"

<u In the early decades of the twentieth-century, lots of "minds" we
g bandied about by various Anglo-American thinkers. Dewey gives us t

d "national mind," the "social mind," the "legal mind," the "popu

Z mind," the "forewarned mind," and finally, the "post-war mind."4 Ran-

^ dolph Bourne added the "war mind," the "state mind," and the "he
<u mind" to the "international mind."5 British philosopher L.P. Jack
6 commented that before the war, the "British mind" did not have t
- "mind" of an imperial power, that is, the citizens of Britain "found
£> difficult to retain the imperial point of view."6 Horace Kallen thoug
^ the most internationally minded people were international financie
^ and entrepreneurs, who had figured out how to profit handsomely du

^ ing both peace and wartime.7

HH The "international mind" functioned as a cultural buzzword. Edu£-h cators said the curriculum needed to become more international
QJ minded.8 The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace establish
<J International Mind Alcoves in many community libraries.9 Sincla

c/D Lewis in Main Street, bemoans, "Though a Gopher Prairie regards itsel
Z as a part of the Great World, ... it will not acquire the scientific spir

<í the international mind, which would make it great.10

Ph There were cynics. Samuel Crowther thought Adam Smith pe

H formed a sleight-of-hand with his "cosmopolitan theories ... the sam

theories which turn up today in the guise of the international mind."
Because Great Britain waited until its manufacturing sector was far
ahead of everyone else's before removing its tariffs, and only then pro
claimed free trade an economic verity, Crowther labeled Smith "a highly

skilled British ballyhoo artist who succeeded in elevating national expe
diency to the plane of highly respectable economic theory."11

Like "globalization" and "diversity" today, the international mind had
no precise definition, yet it functioned within a particular conversatio
among some Anglo-American thinkers. These thinkers believed that
widespread international engagement existed as a matter of fact, and that
by participating in these engagements, people could develop international minds. They thought war was a barbaric regression away from civilized behavior, and that international organizations should be established
through which disputes could be addressed through negotiation rather
than war. Their politics varied widely. Some remained pacifists throughout the war; others supported the war effort whole-heartedly. Some were
conservative laissez-faire capitalists; others leaned toward socialism. Their

thinking on imperialism and government-sponsored social reform

showed the same variability. Since I do not know what Mead read, I wil
restrict my sources for this paper to people I know that Mead knew, and

to people whose writings were widely available to educated Americans.
British participants in this conversation included Bertrand Russell,

,. - ^ Oxford professor and one-time Royce student L.P. Jacks, and Cambridg
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professor G. Lowes Dickinson, all of whom published in the Atlantic g
Monthly and in the University of Chicago's International Journal of Ethics. 2

Nicolas Murray Butler, philosopher, and long-time President of p
Columbia University, claimed to have coined the phrase, "the interna- otional mind," and represented the more establishment and conservative &*
side of the conversation. In his 1912 address to the assembled political, g-<

legal, and business elites at the Lake Mohonk Conference on Interna- R
tional Arbitration, Butler gave this explicit definition. "The interna- g
tional mind is nothing else than that habit of thinking of foreign %'
relations and business, and that habit of dealing with them, which |_
regard the several nations of the civilized world as friendly and cooper- g

ating equals in aiding the progress of civilization, in developing com- 5'
mercé and industry, and in spreading enlightenment and culture
throughout the world."12 For Butler the context for discussions about

the international mind was how to substitute "Law for war, peace with S
righteousness for triumph after slaughter, the victories of right and rea- 2
sonableness for those of might and brute force."13 In a jab at Theodore 5
Roosevelt, Butler said that to swagger, swing sticks, and threaten mili- ^

tary action was not in keeping with the international mind.14 5

Butlers concept of the international mind functioned within the x
late nineteenth century's historical trajectory of social evolution from ¡a
the stage of barbarism, where groups settled differences by force,
toward the growth of civilized societies, characterized by science, learning, art, and culture. Societies became more civilized as reason gained
control over instinct and unruly passions. International commerce and
international juridical and legal institutions contributed to peaceful
internationalism among civilized nations.15 Like most people in this
conversation, Butler assumed that "international" referred to "the civi-

lized world," i.e., European nations, and white settler colonies such as
Canada and Australia. The United States as a white settler ex-colony,
and sometimes Japan and some South American republics, were also
included. Colonized peoples and territories lagged behind on the path
toward civilization, so it was consistent with international morality and
justice that they be colonized.16
For Butler and many others, an international mind is not opposed
to war per se. When "civilized nations" fail to resolve disputes peaceably, nations may respond to aggressors with violence. Butler praised
Germany, France and Great Britain for their adjudication of the Agadir

affair, in which Germany gave up its claim in French-dominated
Morocco, in exchange for a slice of the Congo. Better to negotiate these
matters as civilized gentlemen, than to fight as barbarians.17
Many Europeans and Americans assumed that civilized nations had
outgrown the barbaric and adolescent practice of going to war. Highly
respected and widely quoted theorists such as Jean de Bloch and Nor-

man Angeli documented the extensive economic interdependence -
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ro among "civilized" nations, and predicted that none of the Great Powers

<u would be foolish enough to destabilize this commerce by going to
g war.18 Bourne reminisced on the pre-war years, "The 'international

d mind' was becoming more and more universal, so that an inter-

Z European war would be dreaded with the horror of a civil conflict."19

<u //. "The Psychological Basis for Internationalism, " 1915
6 To internationally minded Europeans and Anglo-Americans, the Great
- War's eruption in August 1914 was incomprehensible. Why were so
£> many Europeans with international minds - scientists, intellectuals,
^ artists, and socialists - instantly overcome with nationalistic fervor?
^ Mead addressed this question in his March 1915 essay, "The Psycho^v logical Basis for Internationalism," published in Survey, a. leading social

_ reform journal. Mead's starting premise, that the war had untethered

f- i hostile impulses from the influences of reason and civilizing experience,

QJ was widely shared at the time. His conclusion, that the international
<J order, based on independent, sovereign nation-states, was deeply dysc/3 functional, was also part of the conversation. What Mead added was his

^ own psychological analysis of these phenomena.20 While Mead framed
<í his discussion in terms of his own theory of the social self, the concepP^ tion of internationalism that he used is consistent with the internation-

H alism of Butler and others. Using an analogy between the social setting
within which the self is constructed, and the international setting
within which nation-states are constituted, Mead in this essay points
out the psychological costs of insisting on full national sovereignty and
the contradictions involved in holding commitments both to the right
of national self-defense and to internationalism.
Mead shared the belief of Butler and others that existing international organization, particularly in international commerce and inter-

national law, was highly developed, making war between European
nations unnecessary.21 Mead saw no reason for nations to fight anymore. Constitutions had been adopted which provided for orderly
change in government; international commerce gave access to labor
and resources, eliminating the need to conquer new territories.22 In this
essay Mead explores the psychological implications of the fact that all
the belligerents claimed they were fighting in self-defense.23 Mead
explains that in fighting to defend their country, people experience
"overwhelming moments of emotion" of "complete identification with
each other in the whole community." Mead says these experiences are
akin to those of saints and martyrs; i.e., the "types of the highest experiences that human nature has attained."24 The war raises the question,
"Are these (spiritual experiences) so valuable that we can afford to purchase them at the expense of Armageddon?"25

Using then prevalent psychological theories of primitive social
- - 2 instincts and impulses, Mead describes how this emotional high cannot

This content downloaded from 131.238.108.120 on Tue, 14 Mar 2017 16:56:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

be sustained, but soon devolves into hatred of enemy.26 Mead writes, g
"To defend successfully their own, men get down to the primitive 8
instincts from which spring battle-fury, the lust of carnage, rape and p
rapine."27 As the war continues, ones hard-earned civility is over- owhelmed by primitive impulses. Mead also identifies psychological sr
instabilities that accompany the claim that military preparedness is the ~
best guarantee for peace. When a nation maintains a stance of readiness fj
for war, a significant percentage of the population must be in a position g

of unthinking, unquestioning obedience to command. Mead com- §•

ments, "It is not and cannot be a nation in conscious control of its own g^

policies and its own fortunes."28 g

Mead applies his theory of the social construction of t
international arena. He makes an analogy between the self a
tuted through social interaction, and nation-states acquir

identity through engagement in the international comm
the self becomes a self through "taking the attitude of
Mead writes, "Nations, like individuals, can become obj

selves only as they see themselves through the eyes of oth

nation-states become conscious of themselves as nations
ticipating in the international arena. Mead cites the exte

tional contacts and organization that led to growth in indu
commerce, and social reform as evidence that an internation
in fact already existed.30 He points out the contradiction e

war, in which a nation seeks to destroy the other nations that p

with the very setting required for its own national self-consciou

When a nations insistence on exclusive national sovereignt

vated by militarism, growth toward international community
ened. Mead makes his own jab at Roosevelt's hyperbolic mas
militaristic rhetoric. While this rhetoric supports "the feel

enlarged personality," Mead spurns its "childish assumption

must pull down amid fire and slaughter the whole structure of t

ern world to secure bulging sinews, deep chests, and red blo
cles." He sides with those social reformers whom the militar
as "white-blooded and feministic." Growth toward internat

through social reform is "vastly more intelligently conceiv
nation-state militarism leads to human catastrophe.32 His Su
ers would have appreciated this confirmation.
In the final paragraph of the essay, Mead identifies the cor

Militarism is not simply an evil in itself. It is typical and conserva

of a state that is narrowly national in its attitude and that refuse

recognize the international society, that after all has made the se
conscious state possible. The problem is then largely a psycholog

problem, for it has to do with the change of attitude, the willing

to accept the whole international fabric of society, and to regard

states and the communities of which they are the in
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CO subject to and controlled by the life of the whole, not as potential eneq3 mies for whose assault each state must be forever on the watch.
a

3 Mead is saying that if states recognized how their existen

Z depended on "the whole international fabric of society," and accepte

^ their position in this fabric, it would be the end of state-sovereignty
v traditionally conceived, and the end to a unilateral, national right t

g self-defense.33

-3 In this essay Mead speaks in his own voice in articulating the anal£> ogy between selves in society and nations in an international commu

nity. However, his political conclusions regarding sovereignty, placed in

h^ the context of Anglo-American discussions of internationalism at th
time, were not novel or radical, nor were they generated from within his

¿~ own theorizing. G. Lowes Dickinson in his December 1914 and Janu
£_, ary 1915 Atlantic Monthly articles, gave highly detailed critiques

qj national sovereignty. Bertrand Russell called war among civiliz

«^ nations an anachronism, and claimed that "So long as the principle o

c/D self-defense is recognized as affording a sufficient justification for war
JZ¡ this tragic conflict of irresistible claims remains unavoidable."34

<J We should also note what Mead does not discuss in this article. He
q¿ does not speculate on the origins of war. He does not discuss territorial

H or economic imperialism, or whether internationalism entails opposi

tion to all war. His references to internationalism in this essay pertain
to political relations among nation-states, and do not suggest a "community of all humanity," or the perspective of an impartial spectator
That is, the essay is different from, but consistent with the internation-

alism of Butler and others described above.

///. Mead's War-time Essays, July-August 1917
In his May 1917 address to the National Conference on Foreign Relations, Butler used his definition of the international mind in justifying
U.S. entrance into the war. Butler argued that the Allies represented th
international mind, while the Germans were pursuing hegemonic control of the world. Thus, it was morally justified for the Allied Powers to

use force on behalf of law, justice, right, and the international mind.35
This analysis is consistent with Butlers pre-war conceptions of internationalism and the appropriate use of force.
During the war many theorists and activists held a range of positions

which all fit under the wider umbrella of "internationalism." Historian

Thomas Knock helpfully sorts American internationalists into progres
sive and conservative wings. He places Jane Addams, Emily Balch, Max
and Crystal Eastman, and some other progressives and socialists among
what he calls the "progressive internationalists." Knock writes, "Jane
Addams played a pivotal role in this wing of the internationalist movement; indeed, she personified its purposes and values perhaps better
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than anyone else."36 Progressive internationalists worked for a nego ti- g
ated end to the conflict. They feared that an Allied military victory 8
would result in a victor's peace, sowing seeds of resentment and hatred p
that would lead to future wars.37 o-

Knock places Butler, Elihu Root, and

Howard Taft with the conservative intern
and more elite establishment group, who t

tory over Germany was imperative. Mo
in the Caribbean, and did not consider

excursions as imperialistic. Former Presid

servative internationalists, founded the
proposed that nations form a league th

conciliation for international disputes. They
national legal machinery, and in contrast

were not concerned with economic caus

ratic character of foreign policy. Econo
"The principal declared purpose of the
make war, immediate and certain war,
war without a previous hearing of the d

the League to Enforce Peace and gav

Meads wartime articles for the Chicag

entry into the war are consistent with con
Like Butler, Mead in these articles frames
German autocracy and the Allies' democra
made in 1915 regarding the costs of war, b
the U.S. with no options. The U.S. had to

eliminate war as "the arbiter of international

We may not like Mead's positions, but J
Mead's support for the war "an about-face
fall of the internationalist Mead into the s

stance in 1917 represented the dominant
the time, and was consistent with the form

advocated in 1915 in "The Psychological B
Joas also claims that "Mead's acceptance of
possible only because it rested on a profoun
nomic motives behind American foreign
naive to think that "imperialism was only
relations among states, not an economic on

not define U.S. economic policies as imp

1917 Chicago Herald article, Mead asserts
never had and could never have imperialist
policy regarding imperialism as expressed
only that of excluding European powers fr
sphere.42 I do not think Mead's position

interpret his statements, we need a br

This content downloaded from 131.238.108.120 on Tue, 14 Mar 2017 16:56:33 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms

co Doctrine. Never formally enacted into law, the Monroe Doctrine
<u evolved out of statements President James Monroe made to Congress in

g 1823, warning the monarchs of Europe not to attempt further colod nization in the western hemisphere. The phrase, "Monroe Doctrine"
Z was coined thirty years later during a Congressional debate.43 In 1904
33 President Roosevelt issued his famous "Corollary," essentially turning
<u the Doctrine into a justification for economic and military interven6 tions in Latin American countries to "maintain order within their
^g boundaries and behave with a just regard for their obligations toward
í> outsiders." The "order and justice regard" he had in mind was getting
^ Caribbean and Central American nations to pay debts they owed to

^ European and American corporations and governments. Under the

^ Corollary, Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson intervened militarily
_ several times in the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico.44 Many
f-H conservative internationalists at the time were well aware of this pracQJ tice and did not regard it as a form of imperialism, but thought it was

<^ fully appropriate.45 Mead's references to the Monroe Doctrine in his
<-o war essays and in his reply to Senator McCormick mentioned above are

Z consistent with this form of conservative internationalism.

<í Mead knew of the counter-position. He had reviewed Addams's
P4 1 907 book, Newer Ideals of Peace > in which she argued explicitly against

H economic imperialism, basing her critique in part on John Hobson's
widely read book from 1902, Imperialism, It is interesting that in his

review, Mead focuses on Addamss chapters that deal with internal
social reform, but he does not comment on the linkage Addams sees
between international commerce and militaristic imperialism.46 Also,
the Woman's Peace Party was a very vocal critic of Wilson's Caribbean

and Mexican ventures. Addams was the national president of the
Woman's Peace Party; Mary McDowell, head resident of the University
Settlement House where Mead was a trustee, Mead's wife, Helen Cas-

tle Mead, and aunt, Dr. Myrna Mead, were members of the Chicago
chapter.47 My point is that Mead's stance on U.S. participation in the
war was not uninformed or naive. With Joas, I think Mead was wrong,
but one can be wrong without being naive.

We could, of course, direct at Mead the criticism that Bourne

directed at Dewey, that supporting the war was contrary to the tenets of

pragmatism. We could also use Addams s critique that as means shape
ends, it is a contradiction to expect the violence of war to issue in an

international, democratic peace.48 For now, my only point is that
Mead's support for the war was consistent with his previous writings,
and consistent with a form of internationalism widely held at the time.

///. The International Mind in Mind, Self, and Society49
Mead makes several scattered references to the international mind In

_ £ Mind, Self, and Society. Aboulafia uses some of these passages in his
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book, The Cosmopolitan Self, to support his construction of Mead s cos- g
mopolitanism. He begins with Mead s conception of the social self, in 2
which the self internalizes the "generalized other," or "the expectations p
of the organized group." People who participate in multiple groups, oe.g., families, clubs, political parties, and so on, can develop imagina- Btion and mental flexibility as they move among these different points of gr1

view.50 Aboulafia refers to Mead's examples of the international scien- <?
tifie community, and abstract groups of creditors and debtors to illus- g
trate how some communities are wider and more inclusive than others. %'
He writes, "These wider communities should be understood in terms §_
of generalized others that are more inclusive, and they can be more >•
inclusive because they operate at higher levels of abstraction." Through 3'
this process, he claims, participants can develop international mindedness.51 Aboulafia stresses Meads naturalism and empiricism, yet sees

companionship between Mead's international mind and Kant's sensus 2
communis and enlarged mentality, Arendt's notion of membership in a g

world community by virtue of being human, and Smiths impartial í

spectator.52

^
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ro wider and more inclusive as their organizational structures become
<u more encompassing. One can think at higher levels of abstraction when

g the communities in which one participates are themselves wider and

3 more inclusive. It is not the case, contra Aboulafia, that the community
Z can become more inclusive because its members think at higher levels of

^ abstraction.

<u Aboulafias examples, taken from Mead, of the international scien6 tifie community and of abstract groups of creditors and debtors illus- trate this point. At the time, many people referred to the international
£> scientific community as an example of international mindedness. This
^ community was not an abstraction, but an actually functioning, well^ organized community of scientists from many nations. They held
^ international conferences, they read each others' work, and they collab^ orated across national boundaries on scientific research.55 Also, Mead is
f-H clear that abstract groups of creditors and debtors are sub-groups
QJ within "highly developed, organized, and complicated human social
<^ communities."56 "Debtor" and "creditor" are not mere abstractions;
c/D they name concrete, functionally differentiated roles in actual communi nities, embedded within institutional structures such as a banking sys-

<^ tern, legal contracts, a judiciary, and so on.
P^ A close reading of Mead s references to the international mind in
H Mind, Self, and Society ', show that Mead did not think we could arrive
at international mindedness through intellectual abstraction, as
Aboulafia suggests. Mead writes of international minds developing in
tandem with the development of articulated, functioning, international
communities. These references are consistent with conservative internationalism, as understood at that time, and are political, rather than
metaphysical in character. They pose problems for Aboulafias position,
rather than supporting it.

Mead discusses three arenas in which universal communities were

becoming functionally organized: in economics, religion, and through
the League of Nations.57 We can to some extent derive what he means by

internationalism and the international mind by attending to what he
does say about these universal communities, by noting those issues raised

by others that Mead does not discuss, and by paying attention to his
examples. First, a caveat. We should keep in mind that Mind, Self, and
Society was based on stenographic lecture notes.58 Mead delivered these
lectures to audiences that had considerable knowledge of then-current
political events and attitudes. He could make quick references to these
events and attitudes, and assume the students could fill in the context.
Thus, today we should exercise caution in interpreting underdeveloped
discussions in the text, and to the extent possible, make their contexts
explicit. With that caution in mind, I want to make two points through
discussing these three universal communities. First, Mead is clear he is

^^ using "universal" to refer to actual, historically developing communities
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and not to philosophical abstractions such as the community of all g
humanity or the perspective of an impartial spectator.59 Second, Meads 2
descriptions of these communities reflect conservative internationalism p

and not the sort of cosmopolitanism Aboulafia attributes to him. oEconomics: Mead begins with a simple description of exchange: X has er
a surplus of something that Y needs. Each is "putting himself in the atti- gn

tude of the other in the recognition of the mutual value which the fit
exchange has for both."60 Mead implies a straightforward development g

from the impulse to make initial exchanges of this sort to a highly articu- 5*

lated international economic system. He writes, "The more complete §_
economic texture appears in the development of trading itself and the gj
development of a financial medium by means of which such trading is 5'
carried on, and there is an inevitable adjustment of the production in one

community to the needs of the international economic community," *
which he calls a "concrete social organization."61 He describes the devel- 2
opment of England's wool industry, which was instrumental in England's g
transition from an agricultural to an industrial society, as an example. He í
assumes a smooth transition from intra-national to inter-national indus- ^
try, ignoring how British imperialism was deeply woven into its industri- £

alization from the start.62 He does not address objections made at the x
time by socialists, Marxists, and anti-imperialists, objections that pro- S3
gressive internationalists took seriously. Instead, the picture of the inter-

national economic community that Mead draws mirrors that of Butler
and other conservative internationalists. These conservative internationalists did not object to the fact that economic relations based on free trade

and supported by the international legal order were maintained by elites
and functioned primarily to their benefit.

Mead makes a quick reference to the Monroe Doctrine that
strengthens this interpretation. In discussing the growth of international mindedness, Mead asks, "The question whether we belong to a
larger community is answered in terms of whether our own action calls
out a response in this wider community, and whether its response is
reflected back into our own conduct. Can we carry on a conversation in

international terms?"63 For Mead, conversations are possible only
among those who share a wide repertoire of gestures and significant
symbols, drawn from an organized community's way of life. Later in
the same paragraph Mead notes, "We have to be on good terms with
our customers; if we are going to carry on a successful economic policy
in South America, we must explain what is the meaning of the Monroe
Doctrine, and so on and on."64 One could describe U.S.-Latin American economic relations at the time as a community with functionally
differentiated roles, but given how the Monroe Doctrine functioned to
uphold U.S. hegemony in the region, I stop short of describing such a
community as having an ethically or politically satisfactory interna-

tionalism or cosmopolitanism. - 1 ^
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ro Religion: In theorizing about religion, Mead begins with humans'
cu fundamental impulses or attitudes to treat each other with kindliness

g and sympathy. These impulses have "organizing power"; religion is the

d vehicle through which they are socialized, as it spirals out toward becomZ ing a universal community.65 Mead names Christianity, Islam, and Bud^C dhism as universalizing religions. Islam he calls a "relatively primitive
<u sort" of religion, one that "undertook by the force of the sword to wipe
£ out all other forms of society." Christianity and Buddhism, by contrast,

-g are more complex forms of religion, which have brought people
£> together, forming socialized, spiritual groups. Christianity "paved the
^ way for the social progress - political, economic, scientific - of the

h^ modern world, the social progress which is so dominantly characteristic
p. of that world."66 While religions often begin as local community cults,
^ through missionary work, a religion can go beyond the culture's boundf-H aries, moving toward a universal community.67

{J "Universal religion" was a common term in early twentieth century
<^ America. It had a particular referent and carried with it particular
co assumptions. The assumption was that as societies became more modJZ| ern and scientifically based, so-called "ethnic" or "primitive" religions
<í would disappear, displaced universally by Christianity or a variant
P^ thereof. While Mead's discussion of universal religion is sketchy, it is
H consistent with this common cultural usage. Whether Mead intended
to or not, his discussion of universal religion conveyed to his audience
a cosmopolitanism or international-mindedness that was Euro-centric
and non-egalitarian.68

The League of Nations: Finally, Mead had strong hopes for the
League of Nations. Alice Hamilton, a close family friend, wrote to her
sister in 1923, "Wednesday evening I dined with the Meads. . . . George
grows increasingly less intimate and less interesting. He is a fanatical
adherent of the League and assumes that all the woes of Europe will be
over when once we have joined it. ... When I think of the way a talk
with him used to stretch my mind I feel as if I had lost something."69
In Hamilton's comment we hear both her own, and Mead's, pain.
We need to take Mead's references to the League of Nations seriously. For Mead, the League of Nations was not just an illustration for
a more general point. It was the location through which the international community of nation-states would take form and through which
this community's generalized other would arise, making the international mind possible. Mead writes that universal community in a political sense "gets an expression in the League of Nations, where every
community recognizes every other community in the very process of
asserting itself."70

Now Mead never claims that the League of Nations had played its
part well, or that its members were well advanced toward establishing

_^n functional relationships. Nonetheless, in light of the League of Nations'
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centrality to Meads discussions of the international mind, I find it odd g
that Mead does not address questions about the League that raged at 8
the time. For example, he does not express concern about the initial p

membership of the League. Hamilton had been suspicious of the o-

League from the beginning, stating "I was one of those who would have Sr

none of it, thinking it would be only a League of the Victors, a second ~

Holy Alliance." She continues, "Miss Addams, as always, was for FJ
accepting even a quarter-loaf, and doing as much with it as could be g

done. But she did lament the sheer unwisdom of the course followed at g*

the founding of the League." Dewey worried that some unenthusiastic jjj^
nation-states might consider the League to be a mechanism for the g
United States, the British Empire, and France "to control the com- 3'
mercé of the world, and to achieve . . . virtual subjugation of all other
peoples." 71 Also, Mead does not distinguish between nation-states, and m

national groups located within or lying across state-lines; protection of 2
oppressed minority nationals was a major debate at the League.72 Nor 2

does Mead discuss the fears and aspirations of colonized peoples, 5

another major topic of discussion at the League.73 In light of these ^
silences, it is problematic to take Mead's comments about the League of £
Nations as indications of a thoroughly humanitarian cosmopolitanism. x
In spite of these problems with how Mead characterizes these three S
universal communities, Mead is clear that he is thinking of actual, historically developing, functionally articulated communities, and not of

peoples powers of imagination or abstraction. While it is true that
Mead's discussions of these communities is underdeveloped, his references to these communities as they were then being constituted imply
attitudes and institutional structures that we today interpret as imperialist and Euro-centric. If Aboulafia wants to use Mead's references to
the international mind and to universal communities to support his
claim that Mead had a conception of a cosmopolitan self, he needs to
address Meads conservative internationalism directly and explicitly.

IV "National Mindedness and International Mindedness, " 1929
In this article we see that Mead has moved some distance from positions he took during the war. He says very little about the international
mind in this article, but he probes the national mind, extending and

deepening his 1915 concerns about community and violence.
First, though, an astonishing admission. In the course of commenting on why nations have been willing to sign the Kellogg-Briand Pact
that outlawed war, Mead writes,
We have learned more from the published archives of Foreign Offices
than we have from the records of battlefields and atrocities. We have
learned that those who controlled public policies and finally mobilized

armies were utilizing fears and hatreds and cupidities and individual
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rt"ì greeds and jealousies which were far from representing issues over
Jj which the communities themselves wished to fight or thought they

^ were fighting."74

^ For readers in the 21st century, this passage runs by quickly. I wonder,
^ though, if Mead was rejecting his stance of August 1917, when he con^ strued the war as a fight between autocracy and democracy. By this time,
g the Allies' secret treaties to divide up Germany's colonial possessions, in
J2 direct contradiction to Wilsons democratic commitment to national self£> determination, had become public knowledge.75 Bertrand Russell's 1915
analysis was proven right. The war was a tragic episode issuing from the

^ imperial powers' "great game," with duplicities on all sides.76

^ ^ By 1929 the League of Nations was established and functioning.

^ While not a member of the League of Nations, the United States had
r, signed the Kellogg-Briand Pact outlawing war except in self-defense.
rj The U.S. insisted that its right to self-defense included upholding the
^ Monroe Doctrine throughout the western hemisphere.77 Mead sees the
co League and the Pact as holding promise. He writes that the League of
^ Nations is "the most serious undertaking to end war which interna<^ tional society has ever made. ... A hopeful project has been put into
CÚ actual operation, and the relations of nations have been subject to a
f- i publicity and a sort of criticism which are novel in history."78 He
explores this question: since nation-states are the units that meet at the
League of Nations, what sort of community unity, i.e., the basis for the
community's generalized other, does a nation need in order to be able
to settle differences peaceably with other nations?
As in his 1915 essay, Mead again seeks a psychological analysis for
why communities resort to violence to settle disputes. Mead turns to
James's analyses of "the rooted bellicosity of human nature" as the
underlying cause. Mead thinks James overstates the case, commenting
that people can satisfy their "bellicosity" by watching movies and reading detective stories. But he does think James is getting at something.
That is, war can be the occasion for individuals to identify their own
good completely with the common good. He asks, "How shall we get
and maintain that unity of society in which alone we can exist?" The
Great War proved that Armageddon was the price of this sort of unity.
We cannot afford the costs of "feeling" unity; we must "think" it,
instead. Instead of a felt "national soul", we need to achieve a "national

mind" through which to think our unity. However, thinking by itself
will not generate a national mind. Since our rationality comes from
internalized social organization, the social organization itself needs to
be capable of generating common interests, and we need to be able to
think of divergent individual interests, not as conflicting, but as differ-

ences in function. The test for national mindedness, then, is whether

the community can identify its common interests and bring these to
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the fore in addressing disputes. If it can, the community will be able to g

settle its quarrels civilly and not via physical force.79 2

We do not now have such a national mind, Mead claims, the kind of p

mind that nations need in order for a League of Nations or a Kellogg- oBriand Pact to work. The use of violence in settling intra-national dis- sr
putes is the indicator that we have not achieved national-mindedness. ~
In the 1920s racial and labor tensions were rife, and protestors were fit
quickly labeled as Bolsheviks and thereby silenced.80 Mead claims that g
as long as the nation responds to labor unrest by calling out the mili- §•

tary, it cannot claim to be nationally-minded.81 S-

There is also our national mythology, how our sense of national g
pride and honor are confirmed by our willingness to fight.82 Mead con- 5'
nects this to the Monroe Doctrine, which in 1928 got some messy publicity as a number of Latin American countries asserted their grave

displeasure at the Doctrine, and especially at the U.S. s practice of 2
defining and applying it unilaterally. Now, in 1929, Mead claims that 2
the U.S. s continued insistence on the Monroe Doctrine indicates that 5
the U.S. is still seeking unity based on the fighting spirit, and not on a ^
national mind. Mead wryly notes, "None are agreed upon what the 5
doctrine is .... No, it is something - no matter what it is - for which x
we will fight. . . . We must be of one mind about it, for it is impossible *
to have different minds about that which no one can comprehend. The
only issue involved in the Monroe Doctrine is this, are you a patriot, are
you a red-blooded American, or are you a mollycoddle?"83
The real reason, Mead claims, why the U.S. holds tight to the Mon-

roe Doctrine in spite of its unintelligibility, is that the U.S. sees the
Doctrine as the final indicator for national honor and national selfrespect. Mead interprets this as reflecting a sense of national insecurity.
If a nation were secure in itself, it could then approach negotiating both

internal and international disputes without needing the threat of violence to back itself up. Mead thinks the Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact and
the League of Nations take us half-way. The other thing that is needed
is a secure national-mindedness in the sense of trusting adjudication
over force. He ends the essay by declaring, "We will get rid of the mech-

anism of warfare only as our common life permits the individual to
identify his own ends and purposes with those of the community of
which he is a part and which has endowed him with a self."84
I do not know how much Meads new appraisal of the Monroe Doctrine merely reflected widespread changes in public opinion or whether

it indicates a change in his internationalism. In either case, Meads
exploration in this essay is remarkable. Most discussions of the national
mind in the post-war years centered on the question of what constitutes

a nation by examining the significance of race, language, shared culture, and so on.85 Mead bypasses that discussion altogether. In his own

way Mead has come to one of Addams' main themes in Newer Ideals of - -«
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/Vtfre, that eliminating internal violence is an essential dimension of
achieving international peace. I wish Mead had continued his thinking
about violence, and had drawn out more thoroughly the implications
for the international mind. I wish he had explored more deeply how
violence fractures communities and fractures selves. I wish he had
placed his theory of the generalized other next to DuBois s "doubleconsciousness," where the generalized other that DuBois internalizes is
full of contempt.86 I would like to see Mead interacting with contemporaries such as Kallen, Jacks, and Mecklin, who theorized the international mind more directly than Mead.87 He died too soon.
This paper is as much about the need to locate political and philosophical rhetoric, as it is an examination of Mead's thinking. "International mind," "enlarged mentality," "universal religion," and other
phrases that Mead used were culturally laden terms. To understand
what Mead meant by those terms, we need to place his writings in close
conversation with a range of his own contemporaries, as well as with
canonical philosophers.
University of Dayton
fischer@udayton. edu
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NOTES

1. Knock, To End All Wars, Chapter 13.

2. Mead, "The Lodge Resolution and the League, 71; see Knock, To End All
Wars, 230.
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3. His Chicago Herald articles include "Germany's Crisis - Its Effect on
Labor - Part I," "Germany's Crisis - Its Effect on Labor - Part II," "War Issue to
U.S. Forced by Kaiser," "Americas Ideals and the War," and "Democracy's Issues

in the World War."

4. Dewey uses the term "national mind" in "In Time of National Hesitation,"
258; "social" and "legal" mind in "The Approach to a League of Nations," 128;
"popular mind" in "On Understanding the Mind of Germany," 225; the "forewarned mind" in "On Understanding the Mind of Germany," 220; and the "postwar mind" in an essay by that title, 112.
5. Bourne refers to the "war mind" in "The War and the Intellectuals," 3; to

the "state mind" and the "herd mind" in "The State," 84; and to the "international mind" in "The Disillusionment," 398.
6. Jacks, "The Changing Mind of a Nation at War," 534-536.
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7. Kallen, 1 he International Mind, 56.

8. Burns, "Making the International Mind"; Leigh ton, "Educational Preparedness for Peace," 17-21.
9. Jones, International Mind Alcoves.
10. Lewis, Main Street, (Chapter 22, section 6, p. 268). http://etext. virginia.

edu/etcbin/toccer-new2?id=LewMain.sgm&images=images/modeng&data=/
texts/english/modeng/parsed&tag=public&part= 1 12&division=div2
11. Crowther, "Minding Our Own Business," 54.
1 2 . Butler, The International Mind 1 02 .

13. Butler, The International Mind 69 '.

14. Butler, The International Mind 103.
15. Butler, The International Mind 48-51, 9, 38.
16. This assumption is implicit in Butlers discussion of the Agadir affair. See
The International Mind 99.
17. Butler, The International Mind 99; see Lyons, World War I: A Short History
32-33.

18. Jean de Bloch, The Future of War and Norman Angeli, The Illusion of War.

19. Bourne, "The Disillusionment," 398.

20. For the relation of war and hostile instincts, see Russell, "Why Nations Love

War"; Russell, "The Ethics of War"; and Murray, "Herd Instinct and the War." On
the need to reorganize the international system of nation-states, see Dickinson, "The

War and the Way Out"; Dickinson, "The War and the Way Out: A Further Consideration"; and Russell, "National Independence and Internationalism."
2 1 . Mead, Psychological Basis, 606.
22. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 606.

23. For the German point of view, see Delbriick, "Germany's Answer;" also
Russell, "An Appeal to Intellectuals." In May 1915 Addams and Hamilton met
with citizens and with heads of state and foreign ministers from both the Central
Powers and the Triple Entente, all of whom claimed that their respective countries

acted in self-defense. See Women at The Hague, Chapters 2 and 3.

24. Mead, Psychological Basis," 604; L.P. Jacks observed this phenomenon in
England during the early months of the war. See "The Peacefulness of Being at

War."
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25. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 606.
26. In Social Psychology as Counterpart to Physiological Psychology (1909)
Mead refers to work by McDougall and others on primitive instincts and impulses
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and discusses how these instincts are stimulated in response to the gestures of others. See 97-101.

27. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 604-605.
28. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 605. Hobson made this point in 1902 in
Imperialismy 133. Dickinson gives the same critique of military preparedness in
"The War and the Way Out," 835; and in "After the War," 113.
29. "The Social Self," 146; Mead, "Psychological Basis," 604. Prior to writing
"The Psychological Basis for Internationalism" in 1915, Mead had discussed how
the self becomes a self by taking in "the attitude of another" in "The Mechanism
of Social Consciousness" (1912) and "The Social Self" (1913).

30. This point was also commonly made at the time. See Bender, A Nation
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Among Nations y Chapter 5, on the international character of social reform move-

5

ments.

31. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 605.
32. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 606, 607; For analyses of Roosevelt's
culinist imagery see Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, Chapter 6.
33. Mead, "Psychological Basis," 607.
34. Dickinson, "The War and the Way Out" and "After the War"; and Ru
"The Ethics of War", 139.
35. Butler, "The International Mind: How to Develop It," 18.
#
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36. Knock. To End All Wars 50.
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37. Knock, To End All Wars 50-55.
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38. Marburg, "The League to Enforce Peace," 51; Knock, To EndAllWars 5558; on Mead's membership in the League to Enforce Peace see Rucker, 21.
39. Mead makes the point that U.S. participation in international affairs
depended on its access to the seas. With Germany's declaration of unrestricted
submarine warfare, the U.S. s options were to fight for the right of continued
international engagement or to acquiesce into isolation. See "War Issue to U.S.
Forced by Kaiser." Also, "Americas Ideals and the War."

40. Joas, G.K Mead, 24, 25.

41. Joas, G.K Mead 26.
42. Mead, "America's Ideals and the War." In an unpublished manuscript on
colonization in Hawaii, Mead encouraged American farmers to settle there. After
discussing the potential for various crops on the islands, he concludes the essay by

stating, "It (the Hawaiian territory) needs American men to roll back the tide of
oriental population which has threatened to take possession of this gateway to our
western coast. Hawaii lies at the cross-roads of the Pacific. The power that holds

Hawaii commands the western coast of the continent and has the only base of
supply for over 2000 miles. The East and the West have met in Hawaii and thanks
to the vigor of Americans it still belongs to the nation who must own it. It needs

to be occupied still more completely by Americans who can adapt themselves to
the Islands in order to possess them" (22-23).
43. Murphy, Hemispheric Imaginings, viii-ix, 4-6, 14.

44. Roosevelt, "Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine"; See also Dawley, Chang-

ing the World, 79; and Whitaker, "The U.S. in Latin America to 1933: An

Overview," 326.

45. See Dawley, Changing the World, Chapter 3.
46. Addams, Newer Ideals of Peace •, Chapter 8; Mead, "Review oí Newer Ideals
of Peace?
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47. On the Woman's Peace Party's protests against U.S. intervention in the
Caribbean and Mexico, see Degen, The History of the Woman's Peace Party, 168173. McDowell, Helen Mead, and Dr. Myrna Mead are listed as members of the
Chicago branch. See Woman's Peace Party Microfilm, Reel 3. Knock claims there
is strong evidence that interventions by the Woman's Peace Party and the American Union Against Militarism, were crucial toward keeping Wilson from going to
war with Mexico in 1916. See To End All Wars, 82.
48. Bourne, "Twilight of Idols"; Addams, Peace and Bread in Time of War, 82.

49. Mind, Self, and Society was published posthumously and carries a 1934
copyright date. Much, but not all of the material is based on lectures Mead gave
in 1927. I hypothesize that the passages I work with are from 1927 lecture notes.
After the events of 1928, Mead would not have referred to the Monroe Doctrine
in the way he does in the portion of the text I use.
50. Aboulafia, The Cosmopolitan Self, 13, 47.

51. Aboulafia, The Cosmopolitan Self, 20.
52. Aboulafia, The Cosmopolitan Self see especially chapter 2.
53. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 155-56.

54. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 154-158; Mead, Movements of Thought,
366, 375.

55. See, for example, Kallen, "The International Mind," 58; Addams, Long
Road ofWomans Memory, 59-60.
56. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 157.
57. See Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 281-298.
58. In Charles W. Morris s Preface to Mind, Self, and Society, vi.
59. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 289.
60. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 258.
61. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society, 282; 301-02. In his 1907 book, The New
Internationalism, Harold Bolee defined internationalism purely in terms of laissezfaire economics.

62. For a discussion of how imperialism and colonization were integral parts
of the development of England's cotton industry, see Marks, The Origin of the
Modern World, Chapter 4.
63. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society 271.
64. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society 271.
65. Mead defines impulses or attitudes as "fundamental socio-physiological
impulses or behavior tendencies which are common to all human individuals."
Mind, Self and Society 303; 290, 258, 272.
66. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 302, 281-82, 293; Mead does not mention
counter-examples. I don't know if he was aware of how Charlemagne used his
sword and cross campaigns to conquer Europe, or of how many North Africans,
weary of corrupt Byzantine rule, welcomed the Muslims as they moved westward.

67. Mead, Mind, Self and Society, 296, 302.
68. For an overview on universal religion during the early twentieth century
see Masuzawa, "World Religions." Selections by Barrows, "Results of the Parliament of Religions" and Miiller, "The Real Significance of the Parliament of Religion," in A Museum of Faiths, edited by Ziolkowski, give contrasting views on the
relation of Christianity to universal religion.

69. Sicherman, ed. Alice Hamilton: A Life in Letters, 268-269. Hamilton
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medicine, and became the first woman professor at Harvard Medical School. She
was a founding member of the Woman's Peace Party and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and remained a pacifist throughout the war.

70. Mead, Mini Self, and Society, 287.
71. Hamilton, Exploring the Dangerous Trades, 235; Dewey, "A League of
Nations and Economic Freedom," 140.
72. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 402-406; Swanwick, Collective
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73. Knock, To End All Wars, 210-214; Macmillan, Paris 191% Chapter 8.
74. Mead, National Mindedness and International Mindedness, 386.

p

75. On secret treaties see Dawley, Changing the World, 177; Knock, To End All
Wars, 138; Macmillan, Paris 191% 105.
76. Russell, "Is a Permanent Peace Possible?" 368.
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77. Walters, A History of the League of Nations, 387.

#

78. Mead, National Mindedness, 389.
79. Mead, "National Mindedness," 390-392, 397, 400-402.
80. Dawley, Changing the world, 160-161, 260; Addams was under government surveillance and charged with being a Bolshevik, see Davis, American Heroine, 251-254.
81. Mead, "National Mindedness," 401-402.
82. Pillsbury, in The Psychology of Nationality and Internationalism, uses
national honor in conceptualizing what constitutes a nation. He states that having
a sense of national honor is the test of whether immigrants have accepted their
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adopted nation as truly theirs. See 216-217.
83. Mead, "National Mindedness," 398.
84. Mead, National Mindedness, 406-407.
85. For post-war writings on the national mind see e.g., Pillsbury, The Psychol-

ogy of Nationality and Internationalism, Zimmern, "Nationalism and Internation-

alism," and McDougall, The Group Mind, Chapters 6-7.
86. DuBois, The Soub of Black Folk, Chapter 1.

87. Kallen, The Structure of Lasting Peace, and "The International Mind";
Jacks, "The International Mind," and Mecklin, "The International Conscience."
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